D 613 

B34 
Copy 1 



(Ma ' ■*m&& • $&« J* L " I ■■ BR* 

HI BHm 






■■^H BH 



Hi 






SHH§ 



lip 

mi 



■ ■■■fg 
*\ t TTyrftmMry\ E 

hbhkHHS* 

HHi 



in 



Hi 

H 
HI 

1 

flfl HH 

■HaHS 



111] 

■■■I 



■■■ 



Bel 



■ ■■■■Hi 

§%§£ »$%$&$! IS! 



IB! 



HHHI 

BhBBh 






■■■■■■Br 

■.';.■•■■-..■■■■ 



WAR INFORMATION SERIES 



No. 2! 



j» 



November, 1918 



AMERICA'S WAR AIMS 
AND PEACE PROGRAM 




Compiled by 

CARL L. BECKER 

Professor in Cornell University 



ISSUED BY 
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 






ttograpi. 



/ 



i 




i 






CONTENTS 



/ PAGE 

Prefatory Note 3 

I. The German Peace Move of 1916: 

German Note of December 12, 1916 5 

Reply of the Allied Governments 6 

President Wilson's Note (December 18, 1916) 7 

Address to the Senate (January 22, 1917) 9 

II. The Papal Peace Overtures of 1917: 

New Events in 1917 . . . 11 

Reichstag Resolutions of 1917 12 

Papal Note of August 14, 1917 13 

Replies of German and Austrian Governments 13 

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope 14 

III. Brest-Litovsk Peace Discussion of 1918: 

The Brest-Litovsk Conference 17 

Lloyd George on British War Aims 19 

President Wilson's Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918) 20 

Count von Hertling's Reply 23 

President Wilson's Address of February 11, 1918 24 

Chancellor von Hertling (February 25, 1918) 24 

IV. President Wilson's Later Statements on Terms of Peace: 

German Autocracy an Obstacle to Peace 26 

President's Address of July 4, 1918 27 

His New York Address (September 27) 28 

V. Negotiations of October and November, 1918: 

First German Note and the President's Reply 31 

Second German Note and Reply 32 

Austro-Hungarian Note and Reply 34 

Third German Note (October 20) . . .„ 35 

President Wilson's Reply (October 23). 36 

Surrender of Austria-Hungary 38 

Germany Referred to Marshal Foch 38 

Armistice Terms Signed by Germany (November 11) 40 

No Peace of Greed or Vengeance 43 

APPENDICES 

I. The "Vital Interests" of Germany 44 

II. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 44 

III. The Kaiser's Views 46 

IV. Peace Terms of Other Countries: 

France 46 

Italy 47 

Serbia 47 

Bulgaria 47 

V. A League of Nations 48 

mj 12 ]9i3 






- Prefatory Note 

There have been dark moments when the faint hearted almost 

believed that the mailed fist and shining sword of the German 

war lord would win a peace "that corresponded to Germany's 

interest' ' and the world's undoing. Those days of doubt and 

distress are gone. Peace is near at hand, but it is not to 

be a "Hindenburg peace." It is to be a greater peace than 

,we thought when we hoped for the peace of Wilson, of Lloyd 

i George, and of Clemen ceau. It will be a peace that conforms to 

l the better thought of all those w T ho have paid by sacrifice and 

j suffering the price of the world's redemption from the imminent 

threat of military medievalism. 

I America has entered this war to see it through, through on 
the battle field and through in the peace conference. Her war 
aims are her peace purposes and her peace purposes are her war 
aims. "In the midst of peace prepare for war," was given a 
sinister meaning by Germany. "In the midst of war prepare 
for peace," has been given the meaning worth the careful thought 
of every citizen responsible now as never before for the execution 
of America's purpose. Upon an intelligent appreciation of the 
unchanging and just principles which have become the program 
of the world may rest the winning of a victory as great as that 
already won by Foch and Haig and Pershing. "A by 

understanding" means for* America not a German y lit a 

peace that looks to a new international order understood and 
supported by all who thoughtfully appreciate issues r than 

territorial readjustments and balances of powt 

The notes and addresses of President Wilson are well kno 
both in Europe and America, but th« 

been formulated by European Governments are m well 

known in this country; and at the present time, when 
ities have ceased and peace negotiations are abo 
is worth while to note the conditions which, from time to time, 



4 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

have led to the discussion of peace, and to bring together for 
comparison the terms of both sides as they have been stated in 
each period. Such a comparison should lead to a clearer un- 
derstanding of America's war aims and peace program, as well 
as the sharp contrast between the purposes of America and 
those of the enemies she was fighting, 

Guy Stanton Ford, Director, 
Division of Civic and Educational Publications. 



America's War Aims and Peace 

Terms 



The German Peace Move op 1916 

/ The first official proposal for peace came from Germany, at the 
close of the year 1916, at a time when, in Germany's eyes, 
victory for her army was already at hand. In the west the 
Allies had no more than held the German line; while in the east 
the Central Powers had gained the aid of Turkey and Bulgaria, 
had overrun Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and had inflicted serious 
reverses upon the British in Mesopotamia. The Italians were 
advancing towards Trieste, and the sea was cleared of German 
merchant ships; but during the first two years then closing, the 
fortunes of war were decidedly with Germany and her allies. 
Under these circumstances the German Government offered to 
discuss peace, confident that if the Allies accepted the offer she 
could get what she wanted, while if they refused it, it could be 
made to appear that they were responsible for prolonging the 
conflict. 

German Note of December 12, 1916. — The offer was contained 
in a note dated December 12, 1916, and forwarded to the bellig- 
erents through the neutral powers, Spain, Switzerland, and the 
United States. The essential paragraph of the note is the 
following: 

Our aims are not to shatter nor annihilate our adversaries. In spite 
of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our 
readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us^ to the 
bitter end, if necessary; at the same time, prompted by the desire to 
avoid further bloodshed and make an end of the atrocities of war, the 
four allied [Central] Powers propose to enter forthwith into peace 
negotiations. 

On what terms Germany was ready at this time to enter into 
peace is not known. In respect to this point, the note said 
nothing except that — 

The propositions which they [the four Central Towers] bring tor- 
Ward for such negotiation, and which have for their objee; 

6 



6 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

of the existence, of the honor, and of the freedom of the development 
of these [the Central] nations, r.re, according to ti cir firm belief, ap- 
propriate terms for the establishment of a lasting p^ace. 

In the note which the German Government sent at the same time 
to the Pope, its aims were expressed as follows: 

Germany i3 carrying on a war of defense against her enemies, which 
aim at her destruction. She fights to assure the integrity of her 
frontiers and the liberty of the German nation, for the right which she 
claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in 
peaceable competition and on an equal footing with other nations. ( x ) 

Such an offer, clearly, could have been made only by those 
who felt that they had the upper hand. It was not an offer of 
terms, but an offer to stop the war on condition that the Allies 
should signify a willingness to accept such terms as Germany 
might propose. For the Entente to have^ accepted the offer of a 
peace conference under the circumstances would have been 
equivalent to an "unconditional surrender" to Germany. 

Reply of the. Allied Governments. — So at least the Allied 
Governments regarded the matter. The French minister, 
Briand, denounced the offer as a "trap"; and Premier Lloyd 
George, speaking in the House of Commons on December 19, 
1916, declared that — 

To enter on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious; 
without any knowledge of the proposals she intends to make, into a 
conference, is putting our heads into a noose with the rope end in the 
hands of the Germans. 

As to the objects of Great Britain in the war, he quoted Lincoln's 
statement: "We accepted the war for an object, a worthy object.' 
The war will end when that object is attained. Under God Ij 
liope it will never end until that time." More specifically, hej 
stated the terms of Great Britain and her allies to be "complete! 
restitution, full reparation, and effective guarantees." The] 
formal reply to the German offer was contained in a joint note 
of all the Allied Governments, December 30, 1916. The Allies 
refused to "consider a proposal which is empty and insincere." 
They declared that "no peace is possible so long as they have not 
secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recog- 
nition of the rights of nationality and of the free existence of 
small states, so long as they have not brought about a settlement 

0) N. Y. Times, Current History, X. 588, 589. 



THE GERMAN PEACE MOVE OF 1916 7 

emulated to end once and for all forces which have constituted 
a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effec- 
tive guarantee for the future security of the world." ( 2 ) 

The reply of the Allies amounted only to a refusal to enter 
into peace negotiations until they had attained the objects for 
which they went to war. What these objects were are stated 
only in the most general terms: they would have reparation for 
injury done; they would have security for themselves and for 
small nations against a like offense. 

President Wilson's Note (December 18, 1916). — It was 

at this stage that President Wilson addressed a note to the 
belligerent nations. The note was dated December 18, 1916 
—that is to say, six days after the German proposal for a peace 
conference was issued; but the note had been written, or at 
least determined upon, before that date, and the President 
was careful to say that his action was in no way associated with 
the overtures of the Central Powers. In his note the President 
pointed out that each side professed to be fighting a defensive 
war; each side professed to be the champion of small nations; 
each side professed to be "ready to consider the formation of a 
League of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the 
worlds 

Thus the objects for which both sides were fighting, "stated in 
general terms . . . seem to be the same." The President 
felt justified therefore in asking the belligerent powers if it 
would not be possible for them to avow the "precise objects 
which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people. " The 
President felt justified in making this request, because the United 
States was "as vitally and directly interested as the Governments 
now at war" in the "measures to be taken to secure the future 
peace of the world." 

This note had a double significance. It assumed that some- 
thing more was necessary for assuring "the future peace of the 
world" than the mere negotiation of particular peace treaties be- 
tween the belligerents; and it asserted that in this larger question 
the United States would have something to say. The r 
amounted to saying that the war ought to result, not merely in 
the establishment of a satisfactory peace between the bellu 

( 2 ) N. Y. Times, Current History, X. 592, S01 # 



8 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

but in the establishment of a new international order in which all 
nations would take part. *} 

The request of President Wilson elicited only a perfunctory 
reply from the Central Powers. ( ?> ) The Allied Governments 
replied in a joint note dated Paris, January 10, 1917. They 
declared, "in & general way," their "whole-hearted agreement 
with the proposal to establish a League of Nations which shall 
assure peace and justice throughout the world." In addition,' 
they defined their objects in the war in the following terms: I 

Their objects will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable 
compensation and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of 
negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply, in all 
necessity and in the first instance, the restoration of Belgium, of 
Serbia, and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due them; 
the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia, and of 
Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guar an* 
teed by a stable settlement, based alike upon the principle of nation* 
alities, on the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to 
the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, and 
also upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so 
framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified at- 
tacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past 
from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations ; the 
liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, of Czecho-Slovaks from 
foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the 
bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Otto- 
man Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization. The intentions 
of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland, have been 
clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to 
his armies. It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate 
Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never 
has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermina- 
tion of the German peoples and their political disappearance. ( 4 ) 

In requesting the belligerents to declare precisely what they 
were fighting for, the President had a very definite object in 
view. He was not, as he said in his note, proposing mediation, 
or even peace. He was seeking for information in order that the 
United States might adopt a wise policy in respect to the war., 
The attitude of the United States towards the war would depend 
largely upon what the belligerents were fighting for. The 

( 3 ) They renewed their proposal for a peace conference, and said that when peace was 
established they would willingly "cooperate with the United States" in the "sublime task" of 
preventing future wars. (N. Y. Times Current History, X. 783.) 

( 4 ) N. Y. Times, Current History, ^, 789. 



THE GEKMAN PEACE MOVE OF 1916 9 

President was severely criticised at the time for seeming not to 
know what the war was about, for seeming to think that the 
issues of the war v,ere in doubt and that the belligerents were 
fighting for the same ends. It is no longer necessary to say that 
the President knew, better than most men, what the war was 
about. What he said in his note was that the aims of the 
belligerents, as stated in general terms, seem to be the same. He 
was not trying to find out what the war was about, but how 
the belligerents would be willing to end it. The President was 
looking beyond the war to the peace, and beyond the peace to 
the measures which might be taken to make it an enduring one. 

Address to the Senate (January 22, 1917). — The direct result 
of the replies which were received was the notable address of 
January 22, 1917, in which the President discussed this all 
important question and the attitude which the United States 
should take in respect to it: 

The Central Powers [he said] united in a reply which stated merely 
that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss 
the terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more 
definitely and have stated, in general terms indeed, but with sufficient 
definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts 
of reparation which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a 
satisfactory settlement . We are that much nearer a definite discussion 
of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much 
Bearer the discussion of the international concert which must hereafter 
hold the world at peace. ... I have sought this opportunity 
• . . to disclose to you the thought and purpose that have been 
taking form in my mind in regard to the dui y of our Government in 
the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a 
new plan the foundations of peace among nations. 

In such an enterprise, the President said, it was inconceivable 
that the United States "should play no part." In such an 
enterprise the people of the United otates had a service to 
perform. 

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and 
their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee 
peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot 
now be long postponed. It is right that before it conies this Govern* 
ment should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would 
feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn 
adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state t h 
conditions. 



10 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

The first of those conditions was that the present war must 
be ended. But to the United States it made a great deal of 
difference in what way and upon what terms it was ended: 

I take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents 
will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements 
may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a 
force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement, so 
much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance 
hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination 
of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be 
made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized 
major force of mankind. 

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine 
whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The 
question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world 
depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure' 
, peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for 
a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the 
stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe 
can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a 
community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common 
peace. A 

This common peace must be based upon an equality of nations' 
and of national rights. But — 

There is a deeper thing involved than even an equality of right among 
organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not 
recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere 
exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereign! y as if they 
were property. . . . Any peace which does not recognize and 
accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon 
the affections or the conviction of mankind. The ferment of spirit of 
whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all 
the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is 
stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where 
there is not tranquility of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and 
of right. 

Besides the equality of nations organized upon the principle of 
popular government, there must also be, so far as possible, 
freedom of the seas and free access to the seas. 

The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and 
cooperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many 
of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established 
may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common 
in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive 



THE PAPAL PEACE MOVE OF 1917 11 

for such changes is convincing and compelling. ... It need not 
be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the 
Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement 
concerning it . 

It is a problem closely connected with limitation of naval armaments 
and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at 
once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments 
opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of 
armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult as 
these questions are, they must be faced with the atmost candor and 
decided in a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with 
healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without 
concession and sacrifice. . . . The question of armaments, 
' whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical 
question connected with the future fortunes of nations and mankind . 

These were the conditions upon which the United States 
might be expected to cooperate with European nations in guaran- 
teeing the peace of the world. The President was of course 
speaking primarily for the United States; but — 

I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends 
of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty. I 
would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind 
everywhere who have as yet had no opportunity to speak their real 
hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already 
upon the persons and homes they hold most dear. ... I speak 
with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every 
man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our 
traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that 
we have professed or striven for. I am proposing, as it were, that the 
nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe 
as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its 
policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be 
left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, 
unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the gr 
and powerful. ... 

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand 
for no others. They are also the principles and policies of forward 
looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every 
enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must 
prevail. 

II 
The Papal Peace Overtures of 1017 
New Events in 1917. — Early in 1917 two events occurred which 
£ave a new direction to the war. These were the Russ 



12 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

Revolution, and the declaration by the United States of war 
against Germany, April 6, 1917. 

The general effect of these events was to bring into clearer light 
the fundamental issues of the war. Hitherto the Governments of 
France and England had claimed to be fighting the cause of 
democracy and freedom against autocracy and military aggres- 
sion; and yet they were allied with the Government of Russia, an 
absolute despotism which was notorious for its suppression of 
popular rights. The Russian Revolution removed the tre- 
mendous moral handicap of trying to fight a war of freedom in 
alliance with the chief enemy of freedom. At the same time, 
the entrance of the United States into the war, obviously with- 
out any desire for territorial or material advantages, but in 
defense of its own rights and for the vindication of just and 
humane principles, cleared the way for the renunciation, on the 
part of the Allies, of all imperialistic aims. More than ever 
before, the war came to be regarded as a clear cut conflict between 
two ideals— the ideal of democracy and the rights of peoples to 
determine their own way of life, over against the German ideal 
of a world empire established by ruthless military aggression and I 
maintained by the power of the sword. j 

As a result of this clarification of the issues of the war, the 
sentiment of the whole world, now as never before, came to the 
support of the Allied cause. Between April 6 and December 8, 
1917, sixteen states, small and great, declared war against 
Germany or severed diplomatic relations with her. Meantime, 
during the spring and summer of 1917, the military situation of 
the Allies was greatly improved. The Germans were pushed 
back on the western front to the Hindenburg line. The British 
captured Bagdad and advanced towards Jerusalem; and these 
victories, together with the active cooperation of Russia in Asia 
Minor, seemed to point to a decisive campaign against the 
Ottoman Empire. 

Reichstag Resolutions of 1917. — These events resulted in 
the first internal political crisis which had occurred in Germany 
since the war began. On July 11, 1917, the Reichstag refused 
to vote the war credits pending the solution of the ministerial 
question; and on July 19, after the resignation of Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg and the accession of Michaelis to that 



THE PAPAL PEACE MOVE OF 1917 13 

office, a declaration was voted (214 to 116) by the majority, 
composed chiefly of the Center Party and the Socialists, which is 
known as the Reichstag Resolutions of 1917. The substance 
of these resolutions is as follows: 

(1) Germany took up arms in self defense "for the integrity of its 
territories.' ■ (2) The Reichstag labors for peace and "lasting recon- 
ciliation among the nations." (3) "Forced acquisitions of territory, 
and political, economic, and financial violations, are incompatible with 
such a peace." (4) The Reichstag rejects all plans "aiming at an 
economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples 
after the war." (5) "The freedom of the seas must be assured." (6) 
"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international 
juridical organizations." 

Papal Note of August 14, 1917. — It may have been these 
events in Germany that led the Pope to suppose that the time 
was ripe for peace. At all events he prepared, on August 
1, 1917, the text of a note to be sent to all the belligerents. 
This note, which was not sent till August 14, was a strong 
appeal to all the powers to bring the war to a close on the basis 
of mutual concession and compromise; and with this in view 
the Pope ventured to propose certain principles " which seem 
to offer the basis of a just and lasting peace." These principles 
were the following: 

(1) '-'The fundamental point must be that the material force of arms 
shall give way to the moral force of right, whence shall proceed a just 
agreement of all upon a simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of arma- 
ments." (2) "Taking the place of arms, the institution of arbitra- 
tion, with its high pacifying function, according to rules to be drawn 
in concert, -and under sanctions to be determined against any state 
which should decline either to refer international questions to arbitra- 
tion or to accept its awards." (3) "The true community and freedom 
of the seas." (4) "As for damages ... we see no other v 
. . . than by setting up the principle of entire and reciprocal 
condonation." (5) "Territory now occupied [to be] reciprocally 
restituted. Therefore, on the part of Germany, there should be total 
evacuation of Belgium, with guarantees of its entire political, military, 
and economic independence towards any power whatever; evacuation 
also of French territory; on the part of the other belligerents, a similar 
restitution of the German colonies." (6) In respect to the Balkans 
and Poland and Armenia, the Pope spoke of regarding, as far as p 
"the aspirations of the populations." ( 5 ) 

Replies or German and Austrian Governments. — The official 

(*) N. Y. Times, Current History, XII. 392. 



14 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

reply of the German Government to the Papal overtures wag 
made public September 22, 1917. It began by relating with 
fulsome self-praise the efforts of the Kaiser to preserve peace 
from the time of his accession in 1888, and particularly at the 
opening of the present war; and asserted that the — 

Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea 
of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the con- 
viction that in the future the material power of arms must be super- 
seded by the moral power of right. . . . From this would follow, 
according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the 
armed forces of all states and the institution of obligatory arbitration 
for international disputes. We share his Holiness' views that definite 
rules . . . for a . - . . limitation of armaments on land, on 
sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom and community of 
the high seas, are the things in treating which the new spirit, that in 
the future should prevail in international relations, should find first 
hopeful expression. . . . The Imperial Government will in this 
respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the 
German Empire and people. 

The reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government, published 
at the same time, was couched in similar phrases. It is to be 
noted that in its reply the German Government commits itself 
to nothing except that it will support every proposal compatible 
with the vital interest of the German Empire and people. (?) 

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope. — The Allied govern- 
ments made no formal reply to the Papal note; but it was semi- 
officially announced by Great Britain, France, Russia, and 
Italy that President Wilson's reply of August 27, 1917, which 
was immediately published, expressed in letter and spirit their 
views. President Wilson, speaking on behalf of the United 
States, began by stating that — 

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the status quo 
ante bellum, and that then there be a general condonation, disarma- 
ment, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle 
of arbitration; that, by a similar concert, freedom of the seas be estab- 
lished; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the per- 
plexing problems of the Balkan states, and the restitution of Poland, 
be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new 
temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the 
peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved. 

With the Papal ideal of a reconstructed Europe the President - 

( 6 ) What Germans considered to be their "vital interests" is indicated in Appendix L. 



THE PAPAL PEACE MOVE OF 1917 15 

was in thorough accord; but he thought it obvious that such a 
program could not be carried out unless "the restitution of the 
status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it." 
The President thought that the status quo ante furnished no 
satisfactory basis for any stable peace, to say nothing of a 
League of Nations; and his reply to the Pope is taken up chiefly 
with giving two reasons for that belief. 

\i The first great difficulty was the character of the German Gov- 
ernment and the ambitions and ideals of the rulers, as distinct 
from the people, of Germany. 

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from 
the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment 
controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having secretly 
planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out with- 
out regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-estab- 
lished practices and long-cherished principles of international action 
and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow 
fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; 
swept a whole continent within the tide of blood — not the blood of 
soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and 
of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the 
enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German 
people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. ... To 
deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His 
Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation 
of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to 
create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German 
people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the 
new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and 
the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the 
malign influences to which the German Government has of late ac- 
customed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its 
power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settle- 
ment and accommodation? . . . The test, therefore, of every plan 
of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or 
merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing Government . on 
the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other* 1 This is a 
test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must 
be applied. . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers 
of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless ex- 
plicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and pur; 
of the German people t hemselves as t he ot her peoples oi t he world w ould 
be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties oi >cr 
ment, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arb 
in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitution of small 



16 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation 
could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the 
purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. 

This was the first and vital obstacle to the establishment of a 
durable peace at that time. But there is another point whioh 
is touched upon, rather lightly, by the President in his reply to 
the Pope; and that is that any attempt to establish a new inter- 
national order, or even to establish a permanent peace, implied 
the adoption of different principles, in respect to economic and 
political practice, than had been commonly followed in the past: 

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw 
before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic 
restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass 
others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or 
deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs 
at. the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no 
reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all 
things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that 
peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Govern- 
ments — the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful — their 
equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a 
participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the 
world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality 
and not seek domination. . . . 

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole 
world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. 
They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage 
of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war 
by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government 
ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any 
people — rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are 
weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismem- 
berment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic 
leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper 
basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That 
must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of 
mankind. 

The President's reply to the Pope looked beyond the immediate 
question of whether ib would be possible to patch up a peace 
between the various belligerents. It was concerned with the 
larger question of the conditions necessary for the establishment 
of permanent peace. In a certain sense, therefore, it prepared 
the way for the much more thorough-going discussion of these 



THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE DISCUSSION OF 1918 17 

questions which grew out of the invitation to attend the Brest- 
Litovsk conference. 

Ill 

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Discussion of 1918 

The Brest-Litovsk Conference. — Three months after the 
Papal peace overtures, an event occurred which soon placed 
the Central Powers in a position which enabled them once 
more to make an offer of peace to their enemies. November 
7, 1917, the Government of Kerensky was overthrown, and 
the Bolsheviki, under the lead of Lenine and Trotzky, be- 
came the masters of Russia. Russia was already at the point 
of economic exhaustion; and the new regime hastened to re- 
nounce the treaties with the Allies, and on December 15, 1917, 
negotiated a separate armistice with Germany with a view 
to immediate peace. The famous conference which followed at 
Brest-Litovsk (December 22, 1917, to February 10, 1918), 
resulted directly in the humiliating treaty which opened Russia 
to German exploitation. But it also gave rise to the most ex- 
tended statements of peace terms, both by Germany and the 
Allied Governments, which had as yet been made. 

The initiative in this movement was taken by the Bolsheviki 
themselves. The leaders of the Russian Government appear to 
have believed that the conference at Brest-Litovsk would lead 
to the negotiation of a general peace between all the belligerents. 
With this end in view, the Russian agents at Brest-Litovsk 
presented fifteen points, which were so wide in their scope as to 
constitute the basis for a general peace. The substance of the 
proposal is as follows :( 7 ) 

(1) Evacuation of Russia, and autonomy for Poland and the Lithu- 
anian and Lettish provinces. (2) Autonomy for Turkish Armenia. 
(3) Free plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine. (4) Restoration oi Belgium 
and indemnification from an international fund. (5) The same for 
Serbia and Montenegro; access to the sea for Serbia, autonon 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. (0) Plebiscites for other contested Balkan 
territories. (7) The restoration of Roumania, with autonomy for the 
Dobrudja. (S) A plebiscite for the Trent ino and Trieste. (9 
tion of the German colonies. (10) The restoration of IV: 
(11) Neutralization of the maritime straits Leading to inland aeas, and 



0) N. Y. Times, Current History, February, 1918, p. 2S-4. 



18 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

of the Suez and Panama canals; freedom of commercial navigation; 
torpedoing of commercial ships forbidden. (12) No indemnities, and 
war contributions to be refunded. (13) No special customs agreements 
and no commercial boycotts after the war. (14) Peace to be nego- 
tiated at a congress of delegates chosen by representative bodies; no 
secret treaties. (15) Gradual disarmament on land and sea; militia 
to replace standing armies. 

Tic Central Powers, had no intention of negotiating a peace, 
either with Russia or with any other country, on such basco as 
those presented by the Bolsheviki. But the collapse of Russia 
had so far improved their position that they would have liked 
nothing better than to draw the Western belligerents into a 
peace conference. In other words, the Central Powers were 
ready, in December, 1917, to enter into peace negotiations for 
precisely the same reason that they were in December, 1016 — • 
because they felt strong enough to enforce their own terms, as 
they in fact did enforce their own terms on Russia by the Brest- 
Litovsk treaties . 

With this idea in mind, Count Czernin, speaking for the 
Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, on December 25, made a state- 
ment intended as a basis upon which tho Allied Governments 
might join in the negotiations then under way with Russia. He 
said that the Central Powers "are agreed immediately to con- 
clude a general peace without forcible annexations and in- 
demnities, " and that they believed that the "six clauses pro- 
posed by the Russian delegation' ' (only the first six of the fifteen 
proposals of the Russian agents had. at that time been mado 
public) might become the basis of such a general peace. Never- 
theless, this Christmas gift to the Allies was made with reserva- 
tions; for Count Czernin added that in respect to these six pro- 
posals it was necessary to make certain observations. These 
observations, which stated the conditions on which the Central 
Powers would accept the six points as the basis of peace, were in 
substance as follows :( 8 ) 

(1) Forcible annexation was not intended by the Central Powers, but 
the question of evacuation of territory now occupied must be left to 
the final treaty. (2) The Central Powers did not intend to deprive of 
independence those countries that lost it during the war. (3) The 
status of nationalities not independent cannot be settled interna- 
tionally, but must be left to the particular Governments concerned. 



(s) N. Y. Times, Current History, February, 1918, p. 262. 



THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE DISCUSSION OF 1918 19 

(4) "Protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential com- 
ponent .part of the constitutional rights of peoples to celf-determina- 
tion," and the Central Powers "grant validity to this principle every- 
where, so far as it is practically realizable. " (5) The Central Powers 
"have frequently emphasized the possibility that both sides might 
renounce not only indemnification for war costs, but ah; o . , . for 
war damages." (6) Germany cannot renounce her colonies "under 
any circumstances." In addition to these six points, the Central 
Powers "approved wholly" the "principle of economic relations pro- 
posed by the Russian delegation." 

These "observations" transformed the Russian proposals into 
something quite different; they meant essentially that the settle- 
ment of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland must be left to the Cential 
Powers, and that while they did not intend to annex Belgium 
or the Baltic Provinces or Serbia or Roumania, the question of 
whether these countries were to be evacuated or not must be 
left to the final treaty. % The treaty of Brest-Litovsk is a con- 
crete instance of the way in which Germany applied her peace 
"principles" in actual practice. (See Appendix II.) 

Lloyd George on British War Aims. — It was this proposal 
of Count Czernin that elicited the address of Lloyd George 
of January 6, and the address of President Wilson of January 
8 ; 1918. These two addresses contain the most specific avowals 
of peace terms which had as yet been made by the governments 
fighting Germany. Lloyd George's address, which was made 
before the Trade Union Conference, may be summarized as 
follows:( 9 ) 

(1) Great Britain is not fighting a "war of aggression," and has no 
desire to disrupt Germany or destroy the German Government . The 
reform of the German Government, much as "we consider that military 
and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism," is a "qu 
for the German people to decide." (2) ".We are not fir*' g to de- 
stroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its u. J or the 
rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turk- 
ish." (3) The proposals of the Central Powers arc either a n 
to concede anything, or are too vague to become the bas 
cussion. (4) The fundamental conditions oi peace are: 
plete restoration of the "independence of Belgium ai 
tion as can be made for the devastation oi its towns and vi 
This is no demand for a war indemnity." (6) "Restoral 
Montenegro, and the occupied parts o( Frainv. 

(c) "We stand by the French democracy to the death in the i 

C) N. Y. Times, Current History, February, 1918, p. 226, 



20 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

makes for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871." (d) Great 
Britain, without reproaching the present rulers of Russia, cannot be 
"held accountable for decisions taken in her absence and concerning 
which she has not been consulted." (e) "An independent Poland, 
comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a 
part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe." 
(/) "A break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims," but 
peace cannot be established upon a secure basis unless the democratic 
aspirations of the "Austro-Hungarian nationalities" are realized. 
(g) "We regard as vital the legitimate claims of Italians for union with 
those of their own race," and "mean to press that justice be done to the 
men cf Roumanian blood and speech." (h) Turkey may keep Con- 
stantinople, but the straits should be neutralized, and "Armenia, 
Mesopotamia,, Syria, and Palestine are entitled to a recognition of their 
separate national conditions." (i) Colonies should be placed under 
"an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main pur- 
poses will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European 
capitalists or governments." (j) "Reparation must be made for in- 
juries done in violation of international law." (k) "A great attempt 
must be made to establish, by some international organization, an 
alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes." 

President Wilson's Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918).— 
The address of President Wilson was delivered before the Con- 
gress of the United States. It was in this address that he stated 
the famous "fourteen points" which constituted the program of 
the United States, because they constituted "the program of the 
world's peace." The fourteen points are stated as follows: j 

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which 
there shall be no private international understandings of any 
kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the 
public view. ) 

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside 
territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas 
may be closed in whole or in part by international action for 
the enforcement of international covenants. \ 

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic 
barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade condi- 
tions among all the nations consenting to the peace and 
associating themselves for its maintenance. @ I 

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken thai national 
armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with 
domestic safety . , 



THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE DISCUSSION OF 1918 21 

V. A free j open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjust- 
ment of all colonial claims , based upon a strict observance oj 
the principle that in determining all such questions of sover- 
eignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government 
whose title is to be determined. 

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a 
settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the 
best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in 
obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed oppor- 
tunity for the independent determination of her own political 
development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere 
welcome into the society of free nations under institutions oj 
her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also 
of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The 
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months 
to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their compre- 
hension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests , 
and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be 
evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sover- 
eignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. 
No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore con- 
fidence among the nations in the laws which they have them- 
selves set and determined for the government of their relations 
with one another. Without this healing act the whole struc- 
ture and validity of international law is forever impai 

VIII. All French territory should be freed and 
vaded portions restored; and the ivrong done to France by 
Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has 
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty y& vild be 

righted, in order that peace may once more be made s 
the interest of all. 

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of I tali; shoul 
effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

X. The peoples of Austria-IIutuiari, . 

the nations we wish to sec safeguarded c dd b( 

accorded the freest opportunity of an 



22 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be 
evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free 
and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several 
Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel 
along historically established lines of allegiance and nation- 
ality; and international guaranties of the political and 
economic independence and territorial integrity of the several 
Balkan states should be entered into. 

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured c secure sovereignty, but the other 
nationalities which arc now under Turkish rule should be 
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage 
to the ships and commerce of all nations under international 
guaranties. 

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected 
which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably 
Polish populations j which should be assured a free and secure 
access to the sea, and whose political and economic inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by 
international covenant. 

XIV . A general association of nations must be formed, 
under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual 
guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small states alike. 

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and 
assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of 
all the Governments and peoples associated together against the 
imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided 
in purpose. We stand together until the end. 

In respect to specific questions of territorial restoration and 
the rights of nationality, the only marked difference between 
the speech of the British Premier and the American President is 
in respect to Russia. But aside from this, the President's 
address lays great emphasis on the conditions necessary to the 
establishment of a new international order. These conditions 
are stated in points 1 to 5, and in point 14. / 



THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE DISCUSSION OF 1918 23 

Count von Hertling's Reply. — January 24, 1918, the German 
Chancellor, Count von Hertling, in an address before the 
Reichstags replied to the addresses of Lloyd George and Presi- 
dent Wilson. The significance of this address is that it was 
the first statement by the German Government which could 
be called in any sense specific. In his reply to Lloyd George, 
the Chancellor confined himself mainly to the Alsace-Lorraine 
question. He explained that Alsace-Lorraine was not strictly 
annexed to Germany in 1871; it was only "disannexed" from 
France, who had formerly wrested it by conquest from Ger- 
many. The main part of the Chancellor's address was devoted 
to President Wilson's fourteen points, which he takes up one 
by one. The substance of his remarks is as follows :( 13 ) 

(1) The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk prove "that we are quite 
ready to accept this proposal [President Wilson's first point, on no 
secret international agreements] and declare publicity of negotiations 
to be a general political principle." 

(2) There is "no difference of opinion" with Mr. Wilson in respect 
to his second point, on freedom of the seas; but to realize this it would 
be well if the fortifications at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong-Kong, and 
other places should be removed. 

(3) The Central Powers are "in thorough accord with the removal 
of economic barriers which interfere with trade in a superfluous man- 
ner" and "condemn economic war." 

(4) "The idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable." 

(5) As to colonies, "Mr. Wilson's principles will encounter some 
difficulties in the realm of reality," but the "reconstitution of the 
world's colonial possessions" will "have to be discussed in due time." 

(6) In respect to evacuation of Russian territory, "we are dealing 
with questions which concern only Russia and the four allied [Central] 
Powers." 

(7) "The Belgian question belongs to- those questions the details 
of which are to be settled by war and peace negotiations 

und Friedensverhandl ungen ) . " 

(8) "The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands; 
• . forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy." 

(0 to 12) Mr. Wilson's points to 12 touch chiefly Austria and Tui 

(13) "It may be left to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 1 
come to an agreement on the future constitution' 1 of Poland. 

(14) The German Government '"is gladly ready, 
pending questions have been $eUled t to begin the exam* 
of ... a bond of nations.'' 

' (») N. Y. Times, Current Ilntorj, March, 1918, p. 380, 



24 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

President Wilson's Address of February 11, 1918. — In 

a second address before Congress, February 11, 1918, Presi- 
dent Wilson made a searching analysis of Chancellor Hert- 
ling's address, which he found "very vague and very confusing. 
. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes the 
unfortunate impressions made by what we had learned of the 
conferences of Brest-Litovsk." The essential weakness of the 
Chancellor's address was in fact this: "His discussion and ac- 
ceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical con- 
clusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items' 
which constitute the body of any final settlement/ 7 Having 
analyzed, from this point of view, the Chancellor's address in 
some detail, the President declared four fundamental principles 
underlying the fourteen peace points: 

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to 
go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The 
principles to be applied are these: 

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the 
essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as 
are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; 

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a 
game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of 
power; but that — 

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be 
made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, 
and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims 
amongst rival states; and — 

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded 
the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing 
new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that 
would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently 
of the world. 

A general peace erected upon such foundations can b3 discussed. 
Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So 
far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental 
are already everywhere accepted as imperative, except among the 
spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany, 

Chancellor von Hertling (February 25, 1918). — To President 
Wilson's address of February 11, Chancellor von Hertling replied 
in an address to the Reichstag on February 25. He could 
not find that his earlier offers had been "received in hostile 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S LATER STATEMENTS OF PEACE 25 

countries objectively and without prejudice. Moreover, dis- 
cussion in an intimate gathering alone could lead to under- 
standing on many . . . questions which can really be set- 
tled only by compromise. . . . We do not contemplate re- 
taining Belgium, but ,. . . we must be safeguarded from 
the danger " of Belgium's becoming after the war the "jumping- 
off ground of enemy machinations. " The Chancellor's reply 
to President Wilson's four principles is in substance as follows: 

(1) He admits readily that "each part of the final settlement must 
be based upon the essential justice of that particular case." 

(2) President Wilson's second point "can be unconditionally 
assented to. . . . One might think that he [Wilson] is 
laboring under the illusion that there exists in Germany an 
antagonism between an autocratic government and a mass of 
people without rights." As to the balance of power, "it was 
England who invented the principle." (3) President Wilson's 
third point is only a deduction from the foregoing, "and is there- 
fore included in the assent given to that clause." (4) "I can give 
assent in principle, and I declare, therefore, with President Wil- 
son, that a general peace on such a basis is discussable." Count 
Czernin, in an address to the Vienna city council, April 2, touched 
upon President Wilson's address of February 11, so far as to say 
that he entirely agreed with von Hertling that Mr. Wilson's 
four points "are the basis on which a general peace can be dis- 
cussed." He saw no other "obstacle to peace than France's 
desire for Alsace-Lorraine," and as the French Government 
had recently asserted that it could negotiate only on the basis of 
the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, "there was then no choice 
left."(") 

IV 

President Wilson's Later Statements on Terms of 

Peace 

In all of President Wilson's declarations concerning . the 

outstanding fact has been the subordination of the particular 
peace between the belligerents to what he regards as the d 

important object of all — the establishment of a new ii nal 

(J«>.-N. Y. Times. Current fiftctary, April. 1018, of peace ton by 

France and other Allied ooiintries, and by Bulgaria see Appendix 111. 



23 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

order. He has throughout enunciated principles and outlined 
specific terms which in his opinion are essential if the final peace 
is to be one which shall prepare the way for the reorganization 
of the world on a cooperative instead of a competitive basis. One~ 
of these essential principles is that no Government can be in 
harmony with the ruling ideals of modern times unless it is based 
essentially upon the "consent of the governed"; and hence the 
league of nations, to which the President looks forward,- can 
have slight chance of success unless it is a League of Nations of 
which the Governments are subject to the popular will. 

German Autocracy an Obstacle to Peace.— One great obstacle, 
therefore, to the attainment of a stable peace and to the or- 
ganization of a league of nations is the autocratic character 
of the German Government. From the first President Wilson 
has distinguished between the German people and the Ger- 
man Government. "We have no quarrel with the German 
people," he said in the address to Congress of April 2, 1917. 
In his reply to the Pope he said that the power which we fight 
— the power "which now stands balked but not defeated, ' 
the enemy of four-fifths of the world" — this power "is not the 
German people. It is the ruthless master of the German 
people." This power it was that began the war, and this power 
is the chief obstacle to peace not only, and perhaps not primarily, 
because it is an irresponsible power, a power not based upon the 
consent of the governed, but because it is a power whose cynical 
disregard of its pledged word destroys beforehand the value of 
any agreement it might enter into. 

If anything were necessary to make this clear, it would have 
been furnished by the brazen duplicity of the German Govern- 
ment in its dealings with Russia during and after the peace of 
Brest-Litovsk. A German politician, writing in the Vienna 
Arbeiter Zeitung of August 27, 1918, stated the exact fact when 
he said: "We have brought about treaties of peace in Brest and 
Bucharest [Roumania] which corresponded to our 'interest/ but 
not to our principles as we presented them in the peace offers." 
The effect of the German treatment of Russia could only be to 
confirm the President's distrust of the present German Govern- 
ment. He has from the first taken a special interest in the 
Russian Revolution; and in his January 8 address he said that 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S LATER STATEMENTS ON PEACE 27 

"the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the 
months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their 
comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own 
interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy." 
Tried by this test, the German Government was condemned 
without appeal. 

President's Address of July 4, 1918. It is not strange, 
therefore, that in his recent peace addresses the thing which 
stands out particularly is the emphasis which President Wilson 
lays upon the character of the German Government, upon 
its lack Of all honor and probity, and upori the necessity of 
ignoring it and ultimately of getting rid of it altogether. This 
point might be regarded as the distinguishing feature of the 
addresses of July 4 and September 27-, 1918. The essential 
passages of the address of July 4 are as follows: 

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There 
can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No 
halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the 
associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be con- 
ceded them before there can be peace: 
I 
\ (1) The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere 

that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb 
the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroy ed t 
at the least its reduction to virtual impotence. 

(2) The settlement of every question, whether of territory, 
of sovereignty , of economic arrangement, or of political rela- 
tionship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settle- 
ment by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the 
basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation 
or people which may desire a different settlement for the so 
of its own exterior influence or mastery. 

f (3) The consent of all nations to be governed in 

conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor a 

of respect for the common lair of civilized society that g 

the individual citizens of all modern states in the 

with one another; to the end that all promises an i 

may be sacredly observed, no private fiots or i 

hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impun i a 



L 



28 AMERICA'S WAR, AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a 
mutual respect for right. 

(4) The establishment of an organization of peace which 
shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations 
will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and 
justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of 
opinion to which all must submit and by which every inter- 
national readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by 
the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned. 

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek 
is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed 
and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind. These 

great ends cannot be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and 
accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances 
of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by 
the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, 
with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and oppor- 
tunity. I can fane } that the air of this place [Mt. Vernon] carries the 
accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started 
forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed 
at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it 
has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people 
as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to 
speak — speak proudly and with confident hope — of the spread of this 
revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself! The blinded 
rulers of Prussia have roused forces they knew little of — forces which 
once roused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at 
heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the 
very stuff of triumph! 

His New York Address (September 27). — In the New York 
address of September 27 it is made even more explicit that the 
Allies and the United States can have no dealings with the Ger- 
man Government, because it is a government which in practice is 
faithless and in principle is undemocratic. These points are 
revealed in the following passages: 

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suf- 
fered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no 
right to rule except .he right of force? 

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them 
subject to their purpose and interest? 

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal af- 
fairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own'wili and choice? 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S LATER STATEMENTS ON PEACE 29 

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all 
peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak 
suffer without redress? 

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or 
shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common 
rights? 

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. 
They are the issues of it; and they must be settled, — by no arrangement 
or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for 
all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the 
interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. 

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we 
speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and compre- 
hension of the matter we deal with. 

' We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind 
of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, 
because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with 
other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk 
and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor 
and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no 
principle but force and their own interest. We cannot "come to 
terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German 
people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the 
word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same 
thoughts or s'peak the same language of agreement. 

In this address of September 27 the President came back once 
nore to the object which he has from the first regarded as 
undamental — the League of Nations, and in this address he said 
hat the League of Nations must be formed at the time of peace, 
leither before nor after: 

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and 
the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most 
essential part , of the peace settlement itself . It cannot be formed n ow . 
If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the 
nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it 
could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee t he 
peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought . The 
reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is 
that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved 
untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the 
peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would 
be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of 
the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Y 

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter, E 
details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like 



30 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and 
I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them 
authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its 
own duty with regard to peace : 

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no dis- 
crimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those 
to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that 
plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights 
of the several peoples concerned; 

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation 
or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of 
the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest ' 
of all; 

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances of special cove- 
nants and understandings within the general and common 
family of the League of Nations; 

Fourth, and more specifically , there can be no special , 
selfish economic combinations within the League and no 
employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion 
except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the 
markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations 
itself as a means of discipline and control; 

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every 
kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the 
world. 

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities 
have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans 
and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere 
as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in 
definite and binding terms. 

It will be noted that in the address of July 4, the President 
formulates the fundamental principles for which w r e are fighting 
under four heads; and in the address of September 27 he likewise 
formulated the conditions for peace under five heads. While 
the President's policy in respect to the world peace is not to be 
fully understood except by a careful examination of all that he 
has said on the subject, the substance of that policy is to be found 
in the twenty-three specific "points" or statements— the fourteen 
points of the address of January 8, the four points of the address 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 31 

of July 4, and the five points of the address of September 27. 
Taken together, these twenty-three statements might be regarded 
as President Wilson's charter for the peace of the world. 

President Wilson's addresses have generally been commended, 
more or less officially, by the Allied Governments, but perhaps 
never more specifically than by Lloyd George on July 5, 1918. 
Speakinrj to American trbops in France, he said: "President 
WibonVj great deliverance of yesterday made clear \/hat we are 
fighting for. If the Kaiser and his advisers arc prepared to- 
morrow to accept the conditions stated by your President he 
\ can have peace, not only with America, but also with Great 
Britain and France." ( 15 ) 

V 
Negotiations of October and November, 1918 

First German Note and the President's Reply. — The sub- 
mission of the German Government was apparently nearer 
than could be foreseen at the time the President delivered 
his address of September 27. On October 5 there was trans- 
mitted to the United States a request from the German Govern- 
ment conceived in the following terms: 

The German Government requests llio President of the United 
States to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all the bellig- 
erent states of this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries 
for the purpose of opening negotiations. 

It accepts the program set forth by Lhc President of ne United 
States L\ his message to Congre . i January 8, am! in his later pro- 
nouncements, especially Lb speech of September 27, as a basis for 
peace negotiations. 

With a viev/ to avoiding "urther bloodshed, the German Govern- 
ment requests the immediate conclusion cf an cxmistice on land and 
water and in the air. 

The reply of President Wilson (October S) was strictly in ac- 
cord with the ideas and principle v/hich ho ha-J co often ox- 
pressed. He said: 

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Govern- 
ment, and in order that bhat ^v ohall 'v as candic 1 End straight- 
forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President 
of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of ih 
meaning of (be note of the Imperial Chancellor. Hoes the Imperial 

(»») London Tunes, July 3, 1918. 



32 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the 
terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the 
United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent addresses, 
and that its object m entering into discussions would be only to agree 
upon the practical details of their application? 

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an 
armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of 
arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United 
States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies 
of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion 
would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers 
immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded terri- 
tory. 

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the 
Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities 
of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the 
answer to these questions vital from every point of view. 

Second German Note and Reply. — The reply of the German 
Government to these questions was transmitted October 12, 
and was as follows: 

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by 
President Wilson in his address of January the 8th and in his subse- 
quent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. 
Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to 
agree upon practical details of the application of these terms. 

The German Government believes that the Governments of the 
powers associated with the Government of the United States also take 
the position taken by President Wilson in his address. The German 
Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to 
comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. 
The German Government suggests that the President may occasion 
the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrange- 
ments concerning the evacuation. The present German Government, 
which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, 
has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great 
majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all his 
actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German 
Government and of the German people. 

On October 14 the President returned the following answer: 

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government 
and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid 
down by the President of the United States of America in his address 
to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and 

i 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 33 

in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank 
and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications 
of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918. 

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the 
conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judg- 
ment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the 
United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it 
his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by' the Govern- 
ment of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfac- 
tory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present 
military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the 
Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that 
this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments. 

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the 
Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Govern- 
ments with which the Government of the United States is associated 
as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the 
armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices 
which they still persist in . At the very time that the German Govern- 
ment approaches the Government of the United States with proposals 
of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, 
and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers 
and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present en- 
forced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are 
pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been re- 
garded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized 
"warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of 
all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants. The 
nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a 
cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation 
are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with 
burning hearts. 

It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of 
misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the 
attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain 
intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government 
has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President 
delivered at Mt. Vernon on the Fourth of July last. It is as follows: 
''The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separate- 
ly, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, 
if it can not be presently destroyed, at least it i reduction to virtual 
impotence." The power which has hitherto controlled the German 
nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the 
German nation to alter it. The President 's words j>\-t quoted natur- 
ally constitute a condition precedent to pea< e, if p tie by 
the action of the German people themselves, The President feels 



34 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, 
depsnd upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character c f t he 
guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is 
indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany 
should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing. 

Austro-Hungarian Note and Reply. — Meantime, October 7, 
the Austro-Hungarian Government transmitted to the United 
States a request for an armistice, conceived in the following 
terms: 

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy , which has waged war always and 
solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence 
of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and 
honorab ! e peace, hereby addresses itself to his Lordship the President 
of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and 
his Allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea, and in the air, 
and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the 
fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of 
January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's 
address of February 12 [ll], 1918, should serve as a foundation and in 
which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of 
September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account. 

To this request, the following reply was sent, under date of 
October 18: 

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian 
Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that 
Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, 
occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, 
have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Govern- 
ment of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which 
the President formulated at that time occurred the following : 

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the 
nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded 
the freest opportunity of autonomous development." 

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the 
United States, the Government of the United States has recognized 
that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the 
German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak 
National Council is a de facto belligerent Government clothed with 
proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the 
Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the 
justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom. 

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere 
"autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 35 

that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and 
their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family 
of nations. 

Third German Note (October 20).— To the President's note 
of October 14, the German Government made the following 
reply, under date of October 20: 

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied terri- 
tories tho German Government has started from the assumption that 
the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice 
should bo left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the 
actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the 
basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. 
The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an 
opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the 
United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable 
with tho honor of the German people and with opening a way to a 
peace of justice. 

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal 
and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces 
and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a re- 
treat, destructions will always be necessary and are in so far permitted 
by international law. The German troops are under the strictest in- 
structions to spare private property and to exercise care for the popula- 
tion to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite 
of these instructions the guilty are being punished. 

The German Government further denies that the German navy in 
sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their pas- 
sengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these 
charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In 
order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the 
German Government has Uused orders to be despatched to all sub- 
marine commanders preceding the torpedoing of passenger ships, 
without, however, for techcdcal reasons, being able to guarantee that 
these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return. 

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President charac- 
terize: the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, 
secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. 
To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation 
of the people in tha German Empire has not been endowed with an 
influence on the formation of the Government, The Constitution 
did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people 
in decisions on poace and war. These conditions have juet now under- 



86 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

gone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed 
in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, 
based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders 
of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. 
In future no Government can take or continue in office without possess- 
ing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsi- 
bility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the 
people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of 
the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to 
alter the Constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the repre- 
sentation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. 
The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only 
by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination 
of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these re- 
forms and demands their energetic continuance. 

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments 
associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a 
clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace 
and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbi- 
trary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the 
overwhelming majority of the German people. 

President Wilson's Reply (October 23). — To this communica- 
tion the President replied, October 23, as follows: 

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German 
Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid 
down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th 
of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his 
subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of 
September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their applica- 
tion, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who hava 
hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on 
Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of 
the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; 
and having received also the explicit promise of the present German 
Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be ob- 
served both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President 
of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the 
Governments with which the Government of the United States ia 
associated the question of an armistice. 

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice 
he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one 
which should leave the United States and the powers associated with 
her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into 
and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. 
The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 37 

present German authorities to the Governments with which the 
Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with 
the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace 
upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the 
military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Gov- 
ernments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an 
armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and 
ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safe- 
guard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Gove rn- 
ment has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from 
the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be sug- 
gested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete 
evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles 
of peace from which the whole action proceeds. 

The Preyident would deem himself lacking in candor did he not 
point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary 
safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the 
constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German 
Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear 
that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people 
has yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist or 
are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice 
now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does 
not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. 
It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the 
German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the 
present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people 
have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military author- 
ities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of 
Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the 
determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto boon 
the masters of Germany. 

Feeling that the whole peace of the world elepends now on | 
speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it hie 
to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh v 
that the nations of the world do not and can not trust t he word of 
who have hitherto been the masters of German poKcy, and to 
out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to und< 
infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government oi the 
United States can not deal with any but veritable representatr 
the German people who have boon assured of a genuine constitul 
standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal witl 
military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Gen 
if it is likely to have to deal with thorn la tor in regard to 
national obligations of the German Empire, it D 
peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained bv k a 
this essential thing unsaid. 



88 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

Surrender of Austria-Hungary.— On October 28, the Austro- 
Hungarian- Government transmitted the following statement 
in reply to the President's note of October 18: 

In reply to the note of President Wilson of the 18th of this month, 
addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government and giving the decision 
of the President to speak directly with the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment on the question of an armistice and of peace, the Austro-Hunga- 
rian Government has the honor to declare that , equally with the preceding 
proclamations of the President, it adheres also to the same point of 
view contained in the last note upon the rights of the Austro-Hungarian 
peoples, especially those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. 

Consequently, Austria-Hungary, accepting all the conditions the 
President has laid down for the entry into negotiations for an armistice 
and peace, no obstacle exists, according to judgment of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, to the beginning of these negotiations. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government declares itself ready, in conse- 
quence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter 
into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the states 
in the opposing group, and for an immediate armistice upon all Austro- 
Hungarian fronts. 

It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures on this 
subject. 

The withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war by the armistice 
signed September 29, 1918, the growth of separatist movements 
within the Dual Monarchy, and a new drive launched by the 
Allies on the Italian front, on October 24, had made peace for 
Austria-Hungary a necessity. On the day following the above 
note to President Wilson, the Austro-Hungarian commanders 
sent .a flag of truce to the Italians, who transmitted the accom- 
panying request for an armistice to the Supreme War Council of 
the Allies, meeting at Versailles. On November 4, 1918, that 
body announced that the conditions laid down by it for an 
armistice had been accepted, and that thenceforth Austria- 
Hungary was out of the war. Turkey had concluded an armis- 
tice amounting to complete surrender on October 31. The 
German Empire alone was left in arms against the United States 
and the Governments associated with it. 

Germany Referred to Marshal Foch. — November 5, 1918, the 
President transmitted, through Secretary Lansing, and the 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 39 

GotnLnt: SWitZerIand ' ^ f ° ll0Win§ "* t0 the G ™™ 

ca2sLSrt ^^a23: & transmit the foiwing 

"In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President 
had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to he 
Governments with which the Government of the United Spates is 
associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if thl Gover n- 
ment, were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and prindp es 

Stales he ' ^ 7^7 1**™ "* ^ "^ advi — <* the Sed 
States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Ger- 
many the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully proTect 
the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Gov 
e nments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce thldctal 
of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, prov ded 
they deemed such an armistice possible from the militarf point of view 

bv thelmel 1 ? 11 * IS n ° W + in re °u dpt ° f a memoran d^ of observations 

' « ti u ^ emmentsonthls despondence, which is as follows: 

the Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the 

SrtT n hlCh ^ PaSS6d b6tween the *«** of the United 

whth% a o^ ow th I h t er ri GO r nm ^- SubJeCt t0 the ^lificaSnf 
when lollow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the 

Government of Germany on the terms of peree laid down in the Presi 
dents address t0 c of j " esl 

settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. 

" 'They must point out, however, that Clause 2 reWi™ *„ „* * • 
usually described as the freedom of the seas Ts oner, f g ° What 1S 
pretations, some of which they couW not Z£ SjSjSST 

CoZr^T'T 111 the COnditions of P^e ^id down in his address to 
Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that vaded 
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed The id 
Goyernments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to St M 

be Zr? lmpheS V % H they UndOTstand «»- compe J : t , '; 
the Alts y nT any f ° r a " damage d0,1C i0 th « civilian popula o, 

"I am instructed by the President to say (hat he i, in agreement with 

to notifv S P ; "' mS<nK ' ,0,i hy the Eree;den « <<> «*«**< vou 

to not.fy the German Government .ha, Mamhal Boch has been 

thomed by .he Government of .he United States and the A1U 

emments to receive properly accredited representa, ves o the 

Government, and to communicate to .hem the terms of an am 



40 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

Armistice Terms Signed by Germany.— The representatives of 
the German Government appointed to negotiate an armistice 
received from Marshal Foch the terms on November 8. After 
conferring with German army headquarters and the Government 
at Berlin, and after receiving certain modifications of the terms 
from Marshal Foch, the armistice was signed, becoming effective 
at 11:00 a.m. (French time) on November 11. The terms of the 
armistice were chiefly concerned with provisions which would give 
to the Allied Armies such a military ascendancy as would make 
a renewal of hostilities by Germany impossible. The provis- 
ions may be summarized as follows: 

1 . Military operations by land and in the air to cease 6 hours after 
signature of the armistice. 

2. Evacuation of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxem- 
burg, with occupation by Allied forces, within 14 days. 

3. Repatriation within 15 days of all inhabitants of above countries, 
including hostages and persons under trial or convicted. 

4. Surrender in good condition of 2,500 heavy guns, 2,500 field 
guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3 ,000 Y minenwerfer , 1,700 airplanes (fighters 
and bombers) . 

5. German evacuation and Allied occupation and administration 
of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, the Allies to hold 
the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne) 
with bridgeheads radiating 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) eastward there- 
from. A neutral zone 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) wide to be left east of 
the Rhine and the bridgeheads. These rearrangements to be com- 
pleted within 31 days after the conclusion of the armistice. 

6. The inhabitants in the evacuated area to remain unmolested. 
There shall be no destruction of factories, food, or unremoved military 
material. 

7. There shall be no destruction of roads, telegraphs, telephones, 
etc., nor removal of personnel employed on the same. Five thousand 
locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars, and 5,000 motor trucks to be sur- 
rendered. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine to be handed over with 
their pre-war personnel and material. Stocks of coal, etc., and signals 
and repair shops to be abandoned. Barges taken from the Allies are to 
be restored. 

8. All destructive agencies (mines, poisoned wells, etc.) shall bo 
revealed within 43 hours, under penalty of reprisals. 

9. The Allies may make requisitions in the occupied regions. The 
upkeep cf the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (except Alsace- 
Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government. 



[ NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 41 

10. Unconditional and immediate repatriation of all Allied prison- 
ers, without reciprocity; previous conventions on this subject are 
annulled, except for Germans interned in Holland and Switzerland. 

11. German sick and wounded, who cannot be removed, will bo 
cared for by Germans left for that purpose, with required medical 
material. 

12. German troops are to withdraw at once from Austria-Hungary, 
Roumania, and Turkey; and from Russia when the Allies decide that 
the Russian situation permits. 

13. German instructors, prisoners, civilian and military agents in 
Russia, to be immediately recalled. 

14. No further supplies for Germany to be seized or requisitioned in 
Russia or Roumania. 

15. The treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, and supple- 
mentary treaties, to be renounced. 

16. Freedom of access to Russia granted to the Allies, via Danzig 
and the Vistula, to carry supplies and to maintain order. 

17 . Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within 
a period to be fixed. 

IS. Repatriation, without reciprocity, of all interned Allied civilians 
within one month. 

19. Reparation for damage done. No public securities which may 
serve as a pledge for reparation are to be removed. The cash deposit 
in the National Bank of Belgium to be immediately restored; also all 
documents, species, bonds, paper money, et<i., in the invaded countries. 
The gold yielded to Germany by Russia and Roumania, to be deliv- 
ered in trust to the Allies. 

20. Immediate cessation of naval operations; information as to 
location and movements of German ships to be given. Allied shipping 
may use territorial waters, without violating neutrality. 

21. Release of all Allied mercantile and naval prisoners, without 
reciprocity. 

22. Surrender of all submarines, including submarine cruisers and 
mine-laying.submarines, with complete armament and equipment. 

23. The following German warships to be interned in neutral or 
Allied ports, under the supervision of the Allies and of the United 
States: G battle cruisers, 10 battleships, S light cruisers, 50 destroyers. 
All other surface warships to be concentrated in German naval I 
designated by the Allies and the United States and completely dis- 
armed. 

24. The Allies and the United States to have the right to Bweep up 

all mine fields laid by Germany outside of territorial w.; :iany 

indicating their positions* 



42 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic given the associated 
powers. To secure this, German forts and defenses at the entrance 
may be occupied by the Allies and the United States, and mines re- 
moved even in German territorial waters. 

26. Existing blockade conditions set up by the associated powers to 
remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea to re- 
main liable to capture. But the Allies and the United States "should 
give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice, 
to the extent recognized as necessary." 

27. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and immobilized in 
specified German bases. 

28. All port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, 
lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material, and supplies, and all 
arms, apparatus, and supplies of every kind, in Belgian ports and 
coasts, to be abandoned in situ. 

29. Russian Black Sea ports to be evacuated, with surrender of 
Russian war vessels seized by Germany, and release of neutral vessels. 
German materials there to be abandoned as in article 28 . 

30. Allied and associated merchant vessels in German hands to be 
restored, without reciprocity. 

31. No destruction of ships or material to be permitted. 

32. Germany to notify the neutral governments, particularly 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, of the cancellation of all 
German restrictions on their trade with the Allied and associated 
countries. 

33. No transfer of German shipping to neutral flags after the sign- 
ing of the armistice. 

34. The duration of the armistice to be 30 days, with option to ex- 
tend. In order to assure the execution of this convention the principle 
of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted, to act 
under the authority of the Allied military and naval commanders in 
chief. 

Certain points in the above armistice have an obvious bearing 
upon the final peace terms; of these the most important are: 

1 . The evacuation of all territory that was not German on August 
1, 1914. 

2. The evacuation and implied restoration to France of Alsace* 
Lorraine . 

3. The i enunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and of Brest- 
Litovsk, together with the agreements supplementary to those treaties. 
(See Appendix II . ) 

4. Transfer to the Allies, to be held in trust for Russia and Rou- 



NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 43 

mania, of the gold received by Germany in accordance with these 
treaties. 

5. Restitution of the cash deposit in the national bank of Belgium 
and of all "documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, touching 
public or private interests in the invaded countries.' ' 

6. Repatriation without reciprocity of all deported or interned 
civilians, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted, 
belonging to the Allied or associated powers. 

7. Reparation for damages done. 

No Peace of Greed or Vengeance. — Internal revolution in 1 
Germany accompanied the signing of the armistice, with abdica- 
tion of the German Emperor and practically all hereditary rulers, 
and the setting up of a socialist republic. Germany was not merely 
defeated, but crushed. The intention of the Allied Governments, 
nevertheless, to adhere to the principles of a just peace as advo- 
cated by President Wilson was announced in an address 
delivered by Premier Lloyd George on November 11, the day on' 
which the armistice was signed: 

"They [the conditions of peace] must lead to a settlement' 
which will be fundamentally just. No settlement that contra- 
venes the principles of eternal justice will be a permanent one. 
The peace of 1871 imposed by Germany on France outraged all 
the principles of justice and fair play. Let us be warned by 
that example. 

u We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of 
greedy any grasping desire, to override the fundamental prin- 
ciples of righteousness. Vigorous attempts will be made to 
hector and bully the Government in an endeavor to make th 
depart from the strict principles of right, and to satisfy some 
base, sordid, squalid idea of vengeance and of avarice. ]Ve 
must relentlessly set our faces against that. 

"A large number of small nations have been reborn in Eur 
and these will require a League of Nations to protect t : 
cujainst the covetousness of ambitious and grasping neighbi 
In my judgment a League of Nations is absolutely essential to 
permanent peace. We shall go to the peace conference to guar- 
antee that a League of Nations is a reality ." (See Appendix 
V.) 



APPENDICES 

Appendix I. — The "Vital Interests" of Germany 

A petition was presented to the Chancellor , May 20, 1915, from six of the 
great industrial and agricultural associations which represent powerful and 
widely spread interests in Germany. They urged that Belgium should be 
subject to Germany in "military and tariff matters, as well as in currency, 
banking, and post." Northern France as far as the river Somme should also 
be annexed for "our future position at sea," and the industrial establishments 
in the annexed territories be transferred to German hands. From Russia part 
of the Baltic Provinces and the territories to the south should be taken. The 
necessity of new agricultural territory, of new mining and industrial districts, 
especially of the coal and iron of Belgium and northern France, were empha- 
sized. 

Nearly all exponents of public opinion in Germany, save the Social Demo- 
crats, advocated large additions to the German Empire as a result of the war. 
Most wished parts of northern France, where there is coal and iron, all of Bel- 
gium, and the conquered parts of Russia, which include rich agricultural 
territory and the greatest manufacturing region. There is another school, 
however — a comparatively small group — who feared that Germany would 
make lasting enemies by such a peace, and who hoped that Germany's gaing- 
would be in a colonial empire. They proposed that the Congo be taken from 
Belgium, Morocco from France, and various islands from Portugal. Both 
those who wished territories from Germany's neighbors and those who wished 
colonies agreed on the importance of the route to the southeast. Germany 
must control the lands as far as the Persian Gulf and, if possible, Persia. 
"Berlin to Bombay" was the dream of one Pan-German. 

Terms v>cre set forth in a petition adopted on June 20, 1915, and signed by 
1,341 important men in Germany, including 352 professors, 158 educators and 
clergymen, 145 high officials, mayors and municipal officials, 148 judges and 
lawyers, 252 painters, writers,, and publishers. It advocated the annexation 
of the whole northern part of France, from Belfort to the coast of the English 
Channel, and the transfer of the business undertakings and estates to German 
ownership. Belgium was to be held and the inhabitants allowed no • litical 
influence in the Empire. The occupied part of Russia was to be retained and 
the land tinned over to Germany. Egypt was to be taken from England. As 
to indemnities, "we ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as 
possible." 

Appendix II. — Treaty of Beest-Litovsk 

The terms which Germany finally presented at Brest-Litovsk were forced 
upon Russia by the advance cf the German armies into Russian territory. 
Lenine and Trotzky signed, March 3, 1918, the treaty held out to them at the 
point of the sword, which is known as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The main 
provisions of the treaty were the following: (1) The surrender by Russia of the 
provinces of Courland, Poland, Lithuania, Livonia, and Esthonia. (2) The 

44 



, TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK 45 

Surrender by Russia to Turkey of Batum, Kars, and certain other districts in 
Transcaucasia. (3) Russia to make peace with Finland and Ukraine, thus 
recognizing their independence. 

Three agreements supplementary to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were 
entered into between Russia and Germany about August 9, 1918. Tr 
agreements provided for the exchange of ratifications before September 6, 
1918, in Berlin; they were published, September 7, 1918, in the Deutscher 
Reichsanzeiger , and fill three entire pages of that paper. — I. The first of th 
agreements provides for evacuation of territory, the chief points being the 
following: (1) Germany will evacuate Esthonia and Livonia after border 
commissions have established the exact boundaries of these two states; will 
evacuate territory east of the Beresina river in proportion to the payment of 
the indemnity of 6,000,000,009 marks fixed in the financial agreement (see 
second agreement); will evacuate territory west of the Beresina according to 
agreements to be negotiated. (2) Germany will not aid in the establishment 
of separate states and nations of Russia, except as stated below. (3) Russia 
will use all means to remove the Entente forces in northern Russia, and Ger- 
many will guarantee that during such operations the Finns will not attack 
Russian territory. (4) Russia renounces ail claims and all right of interference 
in Esthonia and Livonia; agrees to the establishment of free trade to and from 
Russia through Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania; and agrees that 
freight rates shall be as low as possible. (5) After the ratification of the treaty 
between Russia and Ukrainia, Germany will evacuate Russian Black Sea 
territory, except Caucasia; Germany will recognize Georgia as an independent 
nation; and will encourage the production of crude oil in Baku, one-fourth of 
which, or at least a definite quantity, to go to Germany. (G) Russian warships 
to remain in German hands till the final peace. — II. The second agreement 
Telates to finance, the principal points being as follows: (1) Russia will pay 
to Germany 6,008,000,000 marks, and will renounce all counter demands 
including claims for property confiscated by German troops. (2) One and one- 
half billions of this indemnity is to be paid in bank notes and in gold, in 
installments due September 10, September 30, October 31, November 30, and 
December 31, 1918; one billion will be paid in supplies to be shipped in seven 
installments, beginning November 15, 1918, and ending March 31, 1920; 
two and one-half billions will be paid before December 21 , 1918, by the issuance 
of bonds at G per cent from January 1, 1919, floated by the Russian Govern- 
ment in Germany and secured by Russian state revenues; this security to be 
determined by special agreements and in such a way t hat t he ual 

income shall exceed the annual interest and liquidation of t i 
20 per cent; the remaining one billion will be paid according to agreements 
later negotiated. (3) Each Government will regard bank dej its 

territory as lawful deposits of citizens of the other Govern: 
been placed in the name of such a citizen, otherwise it must I 
deposits belong to such citizens. — III. The third agreement relat 
aspects of civil law in respect to exchanges, extensi 

international cheeks, the appointment of commissions for 3 

between citizens of the two countries, etc. 



46 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

Maxim Gorky calculated that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk robbed the Rus* 
sian Empire of 4 per cent of its total area, 26 per cent of its population, 
27 per cent of agricultural land normally cultivated, 37 per cent of its food- 
stuffs production, 26 per cent of its railways, 33 per cent of manufacturing 
industries, 75 per cent of its coal, and 73 per cent of its iron. This was the 
kind of a treaty which Germany had in mind when she declared to the world, 
in order to induce the Allies to enter into peace negotiations, that "forcible 
annexation was not intended by the Central Powers." 

Appendix III. — The Kaiser's Views 

Between December 22, 1917, and March 20, 1918, the Kaiser several 
iimes revealed his idea of the way peace had come and must come: 

"The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people 
lias in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom 
it can absolutely rely. ... If the enemy does not want peace, then we 
must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining 
sword the doors of those who will not have peace." — (Address to German 
Second Army on the French front, December 22, 1917.) 

"We desire to live in friendship with neighboring peoples, but the victory of 
German arms must first be recognized. Our troops under the great Hinden- 
burg will continue to win it. Then peace will come." — (On conclusion of 
peace with Ukrainia, February 11, 1918.) 

"The German sword wielded by great army leaders has brought peace with 
Russia. With deep gratitude to God, who has been with us, I am filled with 
proud joy at the deeds of my army and the tenacious perserverance of my 
people. It is of especial satisfaction to me that German blood and German 
Kultur have been saved. Accept my warmest thanks for your faithful and 
strong cooperation in the great work." — (Telegram to Count von Hertling, 
March 4, 1918.) 

"The prize of victory must not and will not fail us. No soft peace, but 
one corresponding with Germany's interests." — (To Schleswig-Holstein 
Provincial Council, March 20, 1918.) 



Appendix IV. — Peace Terms of Other Countries 

France. — The French Government has not defined its peace terms so often 
or so fully as either England or the United States. It has, however, defined 
them with equal clearness, io has consistently taken the ground that France 
was invaded without cause, „nd that there can be no peace without the com- 
plete evacuation of French territory and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. 
The Government, officially or semi-officially, has strongly approved of Presi- 
dent Wilson's statements of peace terms. Besides, the Chamber of Deputies, 
June 5, 1917, adopted a resolution cf which the substance was as follows: 
"The Chamber of Deputies . . . declares -that it expects from the war 
imposed upon Europe by the aggression oi imperialist Germany the return of 



PEACE TERMS OF OTHER COUNTRIES 47 

Alsace-Lorraine to the mother country, together with liberation of invaded 
territories and just reparation for damage. Far removed from all thoughts 
of conquest ... it expects that the efforts of the armies of her Republic 
and her allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durabfe 
guarantees for peace, and independence for peoples, great and small, in a 
League of Nations such as has already been foreshadowed/' 

Italy. — June 20, 1917, Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs-, 
in defining Italy's peace terms said: "No peace will be agreeable to us whiclk 
does not assure the restoration of ♦ . ♦ Belgium, Serbia, and Monte- 
negro. The restoration of the independence of Poland is also an essential 
clause of our peace terms. The rights of nationality must be protected. It ia 
in moments of danger that the bonds between nations become stronger/* 
Since this date the secret treaty negotiated at the time Italy entered the war, 
promising territorial gains to Italy, has been repudiated; and in April, 1918 a 
the representatives of the Austrian Slavs and of the Italians, at a congress 
held at Rome, agreed to work together to " achieve the unity and independL- 
ence of the Jugo-Slav nation and the completion of Italian nationality/' : 

Serbia. — Before a meeting of the Serbian parliament held in Corfu on Marcft 
31, 1918, the Serbian Prime Minister, Mr. Nicholas Pasitch, voiced war aima 
similar to those expressed by President Wilson. He said in part: "We asl* 
nothing that does not belong to us by right. We demand the abolition of the 
slavery of peoples as it was abolished for individuals. We demand equality 
for all the nations, large and small, the fraternity and equality of all the 
nationalities and the foundation of a free state of all the united Jugo-Slavs^ 
the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the complete reestablish- 
ment of an independent Belgium; the reestablishment of the kingdom of all 
the Czechs and also of all the Poles; the union of the Italians with Italy, of the 
Roumanians with Roumania, of the Greeks with Greece: all this constituting 
the greatest and most solid guarantee for a Just and durable international 
peace/' July 26 it was reported that a Serbian national war-aims committee; 
recently organized in London, included among Serbian — Jugo-Slav war aima 
the following: "The independence and union of the Jugo-Slavs; the Balkans for 
the Balkan peoples; reparation to the devastated countries inhabited by 
Jugo-Slavs; economic and intellectual intercourse with the Allied countries, ail 
they would mean the best support and defense for the future of the nation 
and recovery from the present catastrophe." - 

Bulgaria. — Mr. Radoslavofr, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, in 191? 
defined Bulgaria's war aims and peace terms as follows: 

"We want Macedonia — that is, we don't want it, because we already have* 
it. Our troops are in Macedonia and we will never get out of it. Atallcosfe 
we must be neighbors with Austria-Hungary. Our friendship has grown 
during the war and has become an alliance as solid as a rock. Now we can 
clasp hands across the Morava valley. This neighborhood was very neces- 
sary for us. Some day we should have to have it. I ask myself how much 
have the Austro-Bulgar relations suffered by the unfortunate fact that Serbia 
has come in between us. The way which leads from Bulgaria to Europe is 



48 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

now open. This passage has been secured without the violation of the prin-"] 
ciple of nationality which the Allies have so insistently put forward [i.e. ' 
Serbian land is Bulgarian.] We. have been accused by the Allies of conscripting 
from the conquered countries. The conquered lands are Bulgarian. If we 
have shed our blood to conquer them it is not in order to leave them alone/' 

The official Bulgarian journal in commenting on this says: "Even if the 
latter [Bulgaria] had no right over the valley of the Morava, the need of hav- 
ing a free line of communication with the Central Powers would be for her a 
sufficient reason to claim its possession." 

On May 19, 1916,the NazodniPrava, speaking of the peace negotiations says: 
''Especially on the question of Serbia, our veritable enemy, our diplomats 
must be instructed to be above all severe and inexorable. They must put 
aside all sentiment alism; every humanitarian consideration, and every soft- 
ness of heart. The existence of a Serb state, under whatsoever form that may 
be^ is equivalent to a prolongation of troubles in the Balkans. This state 
which since its independence has not ceased to be a nest of disorder and dissen- 
sions must be exterminated from the face of the earth. . . . That is why 
it is necessary for our diplomats to apply the maxim of Bismarck : No gener- 
osity until after the conclusion of peace." — (Quotations from the Review of 
Reviews, August, 1918.) 

The terms of the Bulgarian armistice of September 29, 1918, are a cheering 
contrast to this: Bulgaria agreed to evacuate all territory occupied by her in 
Greece and Serbia, to demobolize her army, and to store all military material 
under Allied control. All means of transport were to be surrendered to the 
Allies, including all boats and the control of navigation on the Danube. The 
Allies were also conceded free passage through Bulgaria for the development 
of military operations, with the right to occupy all important strategic points. 

Appendix V. — A League of Nations 

The ideal of European unity is an old one, but its development into the 
present proposals for a world-wide League of Nations is essentially modern. 
The older plans serve more as evidence of the beginnings of cosmopolitanism, 
or have suggestions of imperial ambitions or desires to interfere in the internal 
affairs of certain nations, not for the good of the world order of the people 
most concerned, but rather for the good of the interfering powers, as in the 
case of the so-called Holy Affiance. The recent movement toward a better 
international order has had a sounder basis, in the best interests of all peoples; 
and it has come forward logically in the nineteenth century, side by side with 
the development of nationality. This internationalism presupposes the 
continuance of national states, and arises out of their contacts and common 
interests. It is the more evidently needed as the number of nations, and 
especially of struggling nations, increases. Strong nations can no longer 
exist in isolation, much less weak ones. 

The complete breaking down of national isolation, so that every nation is 
now part of the whole WT>rld order, is due to a new economic and social order, 
with which our political organization has not kept pace. The chief agencies 



A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 49 

in drawing nations together are railroads, steamships, telegraph lines, and 
other means of communication, and those aspects of industry and commerce 
which make for interdependence. The last sixty years has seen an increasing 
•multiplication of agencies for international expression and action . They have 
acted in the main intermittently and in separate fields, but the net result has 
been to create a marked' tendency towards internationalism of thought and 
action. Since the holding of the first International Sanitary Conference in 
1850, gatherings or congresses have been held, with varying frequency, to 
deal with such matters as statistics, sugar duties, fisheries, weights and 
measures, monetary standards, international posts and telegraphs, the 
navigation of rivers, submarine cables, private international law, the protec- 
tion of copyrights, suppression of the liquor traffic in Africa, the abolition of 
traffic in slaves, promotion of the interests of the working classes, the ad- 
vancement of international arbitration, promotion of woman suffrage, and 
various topics of a purely scientific, literary, or historical interest. A list 
which makes no pretence to completeness shows 116 such official international 
conferences, held under government sanction or initiative, between the 
vears 1850 and 1907, while the list of unofficial congresses must be very much 
jgreater. It is said that in the year 1907 alone there were over 160 such 
gatherings, official. and unofficial. 

A number of these gatherings have resulted in permanently organized 
international bureaus, with administrative and quasi-legislative powers. 
Examples of these are the International Postal Union, organized in 1874; the 
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (patents, trademarks, etc.), 
organized in 1883; the European Union of Railway Freight Transportation, 
organized in 1890, etc. At the same time there came to be an increased 
reliance for the preservation of peace between Governments on the so-called 
"Concert of Europe" — that is to say, the attempt to settle international 
Questions by means of concerted action of the five or six great powers, acting 
not so much through public treaties as through joint understandings embodied 
in diplomatic notes and other communications. At the close of the nineteenth 
century, when it was clear that the Concert of Europe was giving way to two 
rival alliances, the ideal of a definite federation of Europe, such as earlier had 
been advanced, again revived. Societies, of which the League to Enforce 
Peace, the American Association for International Conciliation, and the World 
Peace Foundation are examples, were formed and were active in the promotion 
of schemes for preventing war. The Czar's proposal of disarmament 
the Hague Conferences, and the establishment of the Hague Tribunal, are all 
indications of the widespread interest in the subject. 

vertheless, at the outbreak of the present war tlu ! of 

Nations was regarded, probably by the gn 
The war, however, has brought about a profound re 
the world in respect to the whole question of war and tl\ 
it; and within four years i Ik 

within the realm of practical politics. President Wilson 
the necessity of so. 
of the present conflict, From the first he has 



50 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM 

ture of his international policy. Party leaders and responsible statesmen in 
most European countries have expressed themselves as being favorable to 
some kind of international organization for the preservation of peace. The 
question is so far a part of practical politics that it has been discussed in the 
British House of Commons (August 1, 1918), and the British, French 
and Swiss Governments have appointed commissions to investigate and 
report on the general question of international reconstruction . The following 
quotations from men in different countries will indicate something of the state 
of opinion on this subject: 

* * "A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike." — (President Wilson, 
January 8, 1918.) 

"The constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its 
objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settle- 
ment itself . It cannot be formed now. If formed now it would be merely a 
new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy* 
It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary 
to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an af ter- 
thought/' Some necessary conditions were stated by the President as follows: 
"No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations 
can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent 
with the common interest of all. There can be no leagues or alliances or special 
covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the 
League of Nations. . . . And more specifically, there can be no special, 
selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any 
form of boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by 
exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations 
itself , as a means of discipline and control. . . . All international agree- 
ments and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the 
rest of the world/' — (President Wilson, September 27, 1918.) 

"It is a moral victory the world should win. I think I do not mistake the 
current of public sentiment throughout our entire country, in saying that our 
people will favor an international agreement by which the peace brought about 
through such blood and suffering and destruction and enormous sacrifices shall 
be preserved by the joint power of the world. Whether the terms of the League 
to Enforce Peace as they are vail be taken as a basis for agreement, or a modi- 
fied form, something of the kind must be attempted." — (Ex-President W. H. 
Taft, September 26, 1917.) 

"A great attempt must be made to establish by some international organiza- 
tion an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes/'-— 
(Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, January 5, 1918.) 

"A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe, and these 
will require a League of Nations to protect them against the covetousness of 
ambitious and grasping neighbors. In my judgment a League of Nations is 
absolutely essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the peace conference 



A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 51 

to guarantee that a League of Nations is a reality." — (Lloyd George, Novem- 
ber 11, 1918.) 

Thiring the first month or six weeks of the war I said, quoting a phrase of 

'stone's, that the 'enthronment of the idea of public right' was the 

definition we could have of the ends of our war policy. Ana that idea, 

ded, could only be realized by a 'real international partnership, based on 

recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common 

will.' I venture to recall those words, lest it should be supposed that what we 

now speak of as the League of Nations was a me;e af terthought . But there 

be no question that President "Wilson has done more than any statesman 

e Entente to concentrate the minds, not only of his own people and of 

Lilies, but of neutral nations, and I will add, so far as they are allowed to 

md know the truth, of the enemy peoples themselves, upon this as our 

Inating and world-wide aim. It is this which, apart from, and in addition 

he special claims and special interests of this or that nationality, justifies 

sacrifice which the great demo racies are making of their blood and their 

-lire, of the best resources of their manhood, of the brightest promise of 

youth." — (Herbert H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal Party in Great 

...in, July 4, 1918.) 

must try to get some alliance, or confederation, or conference, to which 
states sjiall belong, and no state in which shall be at liberty to go to war 
out reference to arbitration, or to a conference of the League, in the first 
pla< e Then if a state breaks the contract it will become ipso facto at war 
witl be other states of the League, and they will support each othc." without 
any need for an international police, in punishing or repairing the breach of the 
[contract. Some of them may do it by economic pressure This may appiy 
perhaps to the smaller states. The larger and more powerful states may do it 
by the direct use of naval and military force. In this way we may n^ indeed 
abolish war, but we can render it a good deal more difficult in the future " — 
(Lord Curzom June 26, 1918.) 

"I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be pres. i d the pre-' 

crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be te promote some amuigei ant to 
which Germany could be a party, by which she 

live or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her j lli is by 
Russia, and ourselves, jointly oi 'y. . . . 

been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals 
rrisis so much more acute than any that Europe has gone th 
ions be safely passed, I am hopeful that tb 
ollow may make possible some more defin 
han has been possible hitherto. "—(Sir Edward t 
ign Affairs, July 30, 1914.) 

"I sincerely desire to see a League of Nations formed 
ecure the future peace of the world after this * ar is ov« 
>est if not the only prospect of pr e s erv ing 
ron t wars in yean , ' — (Sir Edward A i 

>er 24, 19.16.) 



52 AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



PEA 020 934 686 2 



"The establishment and maintenance of a League of Nations such as Presi- 
dent Wilson has advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than 
any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transcend 
^ all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of 
states are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in 
state . ' — (Sir Edward , Viscount Grey , in June ,1918.) 

"The creation of some international alliance embracing all the peace-loving 
nations could hardly succeed without the cooperation of the greatest of all 
neutral nations [the United States, at that time still a neutral], With that 
cooperation, difficult as the effort to construct such a scheme will be, there is at; 
least a real hope of success . Largely in vain will this war have been fought and 
all these sufferings endured if the peoples of the world are to fall back into a 
state of permanent alarm, suspicion, and hostility, each weighed down by 
frightful burden of armaments." — (Lord Bryce, October 3, 1916.) 

"The Chamber of Deputies, the direct expression of the sovereignty of the 
French people, expects that the efforts of the armies of the Republic and her 
allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durable guarantees for 
peace and independence for peoples great and small, in a League of Nations 
such as has already been foreshadowed." — (Resolution of French Chamber of 
Deputies June 6, 1917, approved by Senate.) 

"The union of all the living forces of the country is an essential condition to 
success. It is that which will lead us to our goal — a peace by victory, — a solid , 
lasting peace, guaranteed against any return of violence by appropriate 
international measures." — (A. Briand, speaking while Premier of France.) 

"Now that the heads of the Governments of the United States and Great 
Britain have pronounced in its favor, and the principle has been accepted from 
the tribune of the French Chamber by Premier Ribot, no one would venture 
to call the League of Nations a Utopia." — (M. Albert Thomas, former French 
Minister of Munitions, November, 1918.) 

"In a general way they desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments 
inspiring the American note, and their wholehearted agreement with the pro- 
posal to create a League of Nations which shall assure peace and justice 
throughout the world." — (Allied note in reply to President Wilson, January 
10, 1917.) 

"All states must be pressed to join a League of Nations for the prevention 
of wars. This involves the complete democratization of all countries. The 
rules on which the league shall be founded must be included in the treaty of 
peace. President Wilson's four general principles of February 11, 1918, are 
accepted." — (Memorandum of war aims adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor 
and Socialist Conference, in London, February 23, 1918.) 



HI WS^^mM 1 



SfflK 



EHH 



1 1 tfU-; ,, :V^v* 



SK&fajKiil i^tSSvwS w3sSfiw30 



h9h 



Kill ^ jJjBKB WaMMl^ i lc wMHil^lM6CT^g»f^r aS R-v*K» HMfiSiTart 

ml 



Hi EH raraMtaKS 









LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



020 934 686 2 * 



